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CONSTRUCTIONS OF CLIENT COMPETENCE AND 
THEORIES OF PRACTICE 
Robert Rubinson* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The prevailing model of how lawyers should interact with clients-usually 
called "client-centered lawyering"l-holds that attorneys should submerge 
their own perspectives into those of their clients. Although conceptions of 
client-centered lawyering are far from monolithic, they do tend to assume an 
authentic client "text" or "voice" that a lawyer can, while remaining as 
neutral as possible, transform into legal discourse fit for judges and other 
actors in the legal process.2 Thus, attorneys can and should avoid individual 
value judgments which influence-and thereby taint-their clients' texts. 
However, attorney/client interactions also reflect the tensions and 
complexities that arise in all social interactions. 3 As social actors, both 
• Assistant Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. The author 
gratefully acknowledges the valuable contributions of Barbara A. Babb, Peggy C. Davis, Leslie 
Feiner, Martin A. Geer, Cheri Wyron Levin, Robert L. Levy, Jane C. Murphy. and the 
participants of the Mid-Atlantic Clinical Theory Workshop, at which I presented an earlier draft of 
this paper. The author also thanks Elizabeth Butler-Witter, Irina Azer, and Sara Litzky for their 
research assistance. The author is especially grateful to Randi E. Schwanz for her insights and 
encouragement. 
1. See, e.g., DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED 
APPROACH (1991). This book is a revision of David Binder and Susan C. Price's influential text, 
LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1977). 
2. See BINDER ET AL., supra note I, at 19-21; Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer as 
Translator, Representation as Text: Towards an Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1298, 1299-1300 (1992); Robert D. Dinerstein, Clinical Texts and Contexts, 39 UCLA L. 
REV. 697, 708-710 (1992); Christopher P. Gilkerson, Poverty Law Narratives: The Critical Practice 
and Theory of Receiving and Translating Client Stories, 43 HASTINGS L.l. 861, 945 (1992). 
3. See William H. Simon, The Dark Secret of Progressive Lawyering: A Comment on 
Scholarship in the Post-Modem, Post-Reagan Era, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1099, 1103 (1994). For 
especially compelling demonstrations of the complexities and contingencies of legal representation, 
see William L.F. Felstiner & Austin Sarat, Enactments of Power: Negotiating Reality and 
Responsibility in Lawyer-Client Interactions, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1447 (1992); Gerald P. Lopez, 
Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice: Seven Weeks in the Ufe of a Rebellious Collaboration, 77 GEO. 
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attorneys and clients internalize assumptions about themselves and each other 
which then, as negotiated through discourse, produce a fluid, dynamic set of 
meanings.4 This broader context reveals that operative concepts in practice 
theory-"client voice," "client autonomy," and "attorney neutrality"-tend 
to obscure important dimensions of experience.s 
My general method in exploring these issues is to go from the specific to 
the general. I will examine in detail how one assumption about one class of 
clients-the assumption that the elderly inevitably experience a progressive 
decline in competence-influences how attorneys perceive elderly clients and 
how elderly clients perceive themselves. The elderly are a particularly 
compelling group of clients for such an investigation. Popular culture is rife 
with unexamined and legitimized stereotypes about aging and the elderly. 
The very pervasiveness of these stereotypes renders them largely invisible. 
Because this is a relatively neglected area in legal scholarship and in political 
discourse, the discovery that these stereotypes are not a "real" description of 
the world is shocking. Thus, an examination of elderly clients is a 
particularly rich vehicle for exploring the implications that these stereotypes 
have for representing elderly clients, and also for analyzing how well 
practice theory describes the complex operation of social constructions at 
play in all attorney/client interactions. 
The first section of the article reviews the literature on counseling elderly 
clients, and the recent emergence of models invoking "context" as the 
touchstone for representing such clients. Although valuable in 
conceptualizing how attorneys should approach these clients, these models 
tend to neglect the profound impact of stereotypes about the elderly and 
assumptions about the relationship between aging and competence. The 
second section defines the "idea of decrement"-the assumption that aging 
inevitably entails a progressive decline in cognitive function. The third 
section explores how this assumption leads attorneys to interpret much of 
what elderly clients say and do as the product of cognitive impairment, and 
sometimes leads elderly clients themselves to construct stories about the 
world, themselves, and their circumstances in line with the idea of 
LJ. 1603 (1989); Jane M. Spinak. Reflections on a Case (Of Motherhood), 95 COLUM. L. REV. 
1990 (1995). 
4. See infra text accompanying notes 58-137. 
5. See GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE By 221 (1980) ("any 
consistent set of metaphors will most likely hide indefinitely many aspects of reality-aspects that 
can be highlighted only by other metaphors that are inconsistent with it"); Lucie E. White, Seeking 
•... The Faces of Otherness . .. n: A Response to Professors Sarat, Felstiner. and Cohn, 77 
CORNELL L. REV. 1499, 1509 (1992) (recognizing the need for "multiple theoretical lenses, lenses 
which focus on institutions, on moments of recognition, as well as on the ebbs and flows of 
interpersonal power"). 
31:121] CLIENT COMPETENCE 123 
decrement. The fourth section explores what happens when the two 
perspectives of attorney and client-informed by the idea of decrement yet 
drawn apart by it as well-interact in complex ways. Finally, the fifth 
section explores the consequences of this analysis for client-centered 
lawyering. While the critical message of client-centered lawyering-the 
centrality of client perspectives-remains valid and of extraordinary 
importance to teachers and practitioners, the analysis of how attorneys and 
elderly clients interact raises questions about the idea that attorneys should 
remain "neutral" as they seek to unveil an "authentic" client voice free of 
attorney influence. Rather, legal representation can be conceptualized as a 
dynamic attempt to construct meaning, and this conceptualization has 
important advantages for both attorneys and clients. 
II. CONSTRUCTIONS OF COMPETENCE 
A. "There" or "Not All There" 
Prior to becoming a law school teacher, I was an attorney in a civil Legal 
Aid office that represented elderly people. My clients manifested a broad 
continuum of competence. Some were plainly "not all there" and appeared 
obviously incompetent. For example, one client would laugh uproariously at 
private jokes and fail to remember me even if I had visited him the previous 
day.6 His psychiatrist cited such "inappropriate jocularity" as a prime 
manifestation of his senile dementia. After meeting with this client many 
times, I concluded that he did indeed have some cognitive impairment. 
Nevertheless, to my surprise, he could also, after a great deal of effort on 
my part, engage in meaningful conversation. He was also a wonderfully 
exuberant character whom I grew to like. 
Other clients appeared to present much closer questions. One ninety-plus 
client was nearly deaf. In order to be heard, I found myself raising my voice 
in the exaggerated simplicity and intonation that many adopt when speaking 
to children. He called me constantly, and his quivering voice was 
extraordinarily difficult to understand. What I was able to hear, however, 
seemed to make sense. Surprisingly so, I thought, for someone of such 
advanced years. 
6. In this and in succeeding descriptions of clients, I have eliminated identifying factual 
details in order to preserve cl ient confidentiality. 
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In another case, a client in her late eighties was embroiled in a long-
standing dispute with her landlord. After trying for months to determine 
why she was not receiving a pension to which she was entitled, I began to 
suspect strongly that her son was taking the benefits for himself-an example 
of one particularly pervasive form of elder abuse. 7 When I asked her about 
it, she seemed remarkably serene, and simply said I should speak to herson 
about it; her son, she told me, handled all her finances. My initial reaction 
was that she was old and could not assimilate the awful truth that her son 
was taking advantage of her. Although the case was taken over by a new 
attorney after I left Legal Aid, I have thought about the case for some time, 
and I have come to suspect-although I can never be sure-that she knew 
exactly what was going on, and was perfectly at ease with it. 
Needless to say, I encountered many clients who were surprisingly "all 
there." I would view such clients who were over eighty as especially 
remarkable for their age. 8 
In all of these cases, I WOUld, of course, seek to understand my clients' 
circumstances and goals and try to implement them. For clients who 
appeared to be marginally competent, I would, to the extent possible, try not 
to impose my own ideas about what was best for the client. When a client 
whom I perceived to be obviously incompetent was involved in litigation, I 
would dutifully move for appointment of a guardian ad litem.9 Whatever the 
circumstances of a particular case, however, I found myself freely offering 
advice to elderly clients, and, on occasion, actively persuading them to 
follow it. In my mind, this advice-giving was motivated by compassion and 
a recognition of the extraordinary vulnerability of the elderly. 
In fact, my reactions to these clients were suffused with assumptions 
about the elderly and the aging process. I drew inferences from the age and 
characteristics of these clients, and these inferences-described more fully 
belowlO-in turn influenced how I viewed the client and the client's problems 
and thus, ultimately, how I approached the representation. 
7. See. e.g .. Stanley S. Herr, Representation of Clients with Disabilities: Issues of Ethics 
and Control, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 609,628 (1990). 
8. Many studies of the elderly draw distinctions among the "young old" and the "old old." 
For example, the World Health Organization describes those people ages 60-75 as "elderly," those 
76-90 as "old," and those over 90 as "very old." ALEXANDER P. SPENCE, THE BIOLOGY OF 
HUMAN AGING 7 (1995). 
9. As a New York practitioner, I was governed by N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1202 (McKinney 1994). 
10. See infra text accompanying notes 39-86. 
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B. Traditional Approaches to Competence 
There is virtually no legal literature on how attorneys and the elderly 
construct their conceptions of competence and how these play out in 
attorney/client interactions. 11 There is, however, a considerable body of 
literature about the appropriate analysis attorneys should apply in 
determining how best to counsel clients assuming that they are of 
"questionable competence." This literature sets the context for exploring 
from a different perspective the patterns that emerge when attorneys construe 
the competence of elderly clients. 
Traditional approaches to competence assume that competence is 
determinate and discoverable. As such, "competence" forms an important 
link in the "agency" conception of legal representation. 12 Thus, if the 
client/principal lacks competence, the attorney/agent lacks authority to act on 
the client/principal's behalf, thus nullifying an attorney's authority to 
represent a client. 13 
However, this approach is fraught with difficulties. A primary problem 
is the lack of a meaningful definition of competence. 14 The legal concept of 
"competence" is an either/or proposition: either you have it or you don't. 
At first blush, this approach seems reasonable enough given that 
"competence" has an air of scientific precision. However, psychiatrists do 
not agree: 
11. Although not focusing on attorney/client interactions, one recent article does examine 
how prejudice against the elderly plays out in courts and legislatures. See Linda S. Whitton, 
Ageism: Paternalism and Prejudice, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 453 (1997). 
12. See, e.g., Jan Ellen Rein, Clients with Destructive and Socially Harmful Choices-What's 
an Attorney To Do: Within and Beyond the Competency Construct, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1101, 
1133 (1994); see also Pioneer Inv. Servo Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd., 507 U.S. 380, 396 (1993) 
(describing attorney as acting as client's agent). 
13. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 404 (1996) 
("principles of agency law might operate to suspend or terminate the lawyer's authority to act when 
a client becomes incompetent"). For an elaboration of ethical issues in representing clients with 
diminished competence through traditional agency principles, see James R. Devine, The Ethics of 
Representing The Disabled Client: Does Model Rule 1.14 Adequately Resolve The Best 
Interests/Advocacy Dilemma?, 49 Mo. L. REV. 493 (1984). 
14. See William E. Adams & Rebecca C. Morgan, Representing the Client Who Is Older in 
the Law Office and the Counroom, 2 ELDER L.J. I, 17-22 (1994); Herr, supra note 7, at 617-18. 
Indeed, typical legal formulations tend toward the tautological, such as the widely used definition of 
"incapacitated person" from the Uniform Probate Code: "[A person] impaired by reason of mental 
illness, mental deficiency, physical illness or disability ... or other cause (except minority) to the 
extent of lacking sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible 
decisions." UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-103(7), 8 U.L.A. 327 (1988). See also Bobbe Shapiro 
Nolan, Functional Evaluation of the Elderly in Guardianship Proceedings, in LEGAL AND ETHICAL 
ASPECTS OF HEALTH CARE FOR THE ELDERLY 212, 217-21 (Marshall B. Kapp et al. eds. 1986) 
(classifying statutory definitions of incompetence and incapacity). 
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The law has tended to address competency as a fixed attribute of an 
individual, a characteristic in itself with an inherent stability. The 
clinician, on the other hand, knows that what the law calls 
competency is, in fact, a set of deductions from a variety of 
clinical data that can be as subject to influence and change as 'the 
more basic mental attributes on which it is based. 15 
The fluidity of competence is both a clinical and a philosophical 
conclusion. The commonplace conception of "competence" presupposes that 
"competence" has an essence and that this essence is static, definable, and 
discoverable. ,However, there are a vast array of diminished mental 
capacities which vary not only from person to person, but within individuals 
depending on, among other things, the subject matter at issue, the time of 
day, and/or the person or persons interacting with the purportedly 
incompetent person. 16 In other words, inquiries concerning competence are 
intensely contextual and thus not susceptible to a "one size fits all" 
definition. 17 Given such a conceptual morass, many commentators have 
given up. Indeed, one has despairingly noted that issues of competence are 
"the black hole of legal ethics. ,,18 
15. Paul S. Appelbaum & Loren H. Roth, Clinical Issues in the Assessment of Competency, 
138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1462, 1466 (1981); see also Rein, supra note 12, at 1120-25. 
16. See Terrie Todd Wetle, Ethical Aspects of Decision Making For and With the Elderly, in 
LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF HEALTH CARE FOR THE ELDERLY 258,264 (Marshall B. Kapp 
et al. eds., 1986); Gerald K. Goodenough, The Lack of Objectivity of Physician Evaluations in 
Geriatric Guardianship Cases, 14 J. CONTEMP. L. 53, 55-56 (1988). 
17. This issue implicates a broader philosophical debate about essentialism. For an 
interesting discussion of this issue, see DANIEL C. DENNETT, DARWIN'S DANGEROUS IDEA: 
EVOLUTION AND THE MEANING OF LIFE 201-202 (1995). 
18. Peter Margulies, Access, Connection, and Voice: A Contextual Approach to Representing 
Senior Citizens of Questionable Capacity, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1073, 1082 (1994). The rules of 
ethics themselves offer little meaningful guidance on how attorneys should approach whether or not 
a client is competent. As has been addressed in depth elsewhere, the Model Rules, at bottom, 
merely highlight potential ethical pitfalls without offering a sense of what factors or facts are 
relevant in reaching appropriate decisions about whether a client is competent. See Herr, supra note 
7, at 615-20. The Model Rules, however, unlike the older Model Code, at least do recognize 
"intermediate degrees of competence" and encourage lawyers "as far as reasonably possible, [tol 
maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship" with an impaired client. MODEL RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.14 cmt. (1996); see also David F. Chavkin, Fuzzy Thinking: A 
Borrowed Paradigmfor Crisper Lawyering, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 163, 186 (1997). 
It is interesting to note the distinction between the issue of capacity and other terms in the law-
such as the "reasonable person" standard in tort law-which are classically difficult to define. 
Absent precise definition by courts or legislatures, any detinition of "reasonable person" necessarily 
entails an exploration of what such a person would do "under the circumstances of the particular 
case"-in other words, in context. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 285 cmt. d (emphasis 
added). In contrast, the classic view holds that capacity operates independently of context. 
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There is yet another difficulty with the traditional agency approach to 
competence. If the principal/agency relationship breaks down, the law 
provides an alternative: guardianship. However, many observers take a dim 
view of guardianship for at least two reasons. 19 First, there is no reason to 
believe that judges are in a better position than anyone else to reach 
principled decisions about a fluid legal fiction like "competence. ,,20 Second, 
given inadequate judicial oversight subsequent to the appointment of a 
guardian, the alleged incompetent person might be subject to the whims of 
unscrupulous guardians or conservators.21 
In light of these conceptual and practical considerations, most 
practitioners and scholars now conclude that although it is not necessarily a 
good idea for attorneys to err on the side of representing clients of 
questionable competence-what the Model Rules call "de facto 
guardianship,,22-it is a worse idea to turn to guardianship.23 A third 
alternative-declining or withdrawing from representation-might, of course, 
be available but unattractive; these clients are often in deep trouble with few 
or no allies, and declining or withdrawing from representation solves the 
lawyer's dilemma at the cost of leaving vulnerable individuals 
unrepresented. 24 Thus there is a general presumption in practice, and 
increasingly in theory, in favor of representing a questionably competent 
client without going through the elaborate procedures required for a formal 
appointment of a guardian or other substitute decision-maker. 
19. See Paul R. Tremblay, Impromptu LAwyering and De Facto Guardians, 62 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1429, 1436 (1994); see also Herr, supra note 7, at 623 (noting that "guardianship has been 
criticized as outmoded, overused, and harmful"). 
20. See Paul R. Tremblay, On Persuasion and Paternalism: LAwyer Decisionmaking and the 
Questionably Competent Client, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 515, 562-563. Indeed, even though there is a 
legal presumption in favor of a finding of competence, see STANLEY S. HERR ET AL., LEGAL 
RIGHTS AND MENTAL HEALTH CARE 23 (1983), judges tend to grant guardianship petitions in cases 
involving the elderly in overwhelming numbers. See Arnold 1. Rosoff & Gary L. Gottlieb, 
Preserving Personal Autonomy for the Elderly: Competency, Guardianship, and Alzheimer's 
Disease, 8 1. LEGAL MED. I, 16 (1986). Tremblay speculates that judges do so because the 
appointment of a guardian is safer; after all, denial of the appointment might risk "unpaid bills. lack 
of food and heat, and eviction or foreclosure." Tremblay, supra at 562-63. 
21. See. e.g., Tremblay, supra note 20, at 565. 
22. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.14 cmt. 2 (1996). 
23. Indeed, a leading commentator on these issues, Paul R. Tremblay, has acknowledged that 
he no longer disapproves of the notion of attorneys acting as "de facto" guardians. See Tremblay, 
supra note 19, at 1436 n.25. 
24. See Margulies, supra note 18, at 1076-77 (noting the "duty to maximize the availability 
of legal services" to "challenged seniors"); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 
Formal Op. 404 (1996) (stating that while solving the "lawyer's dilemma," withdrawal "may leave 
the impaired client without help at a time when the client needs it most"). 
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Given that attorneys frequently will represent a client of questionable 
competence without seeking a guardian, issues of how an attorney should 
counsel and interact with such clients become highly significant. These 
issues are characteristically framed in terms of a debate between those who 
hold that an attorney's role is to advocate on behalf of what a client wants (a 
view that values a client's "autonomy" above all else), and those who 
believe that an attorney has a role in actively determining what is in the "best 
interests" of the client. 25 This debate assumes that lawyers have two choices: 
1) an attorney should at most facilitate the client in making an educated, 
"autonomous" choice; or 2) an attorney should reach decisions based upon 
what the attorney paternalistically believes to be in the "best interests" of the 
client even if inconsistent with the stated views of the client. 26 
However, some have argued that autonomy and paternalism may reduce 
to the same thing: both valorize what is, in the attorney's view, best for the 
client. 27 Thus, attorneys who adopt the "autonomy" view inevitably shade 
the nature of their advice by choosing the content, style, and order of their 
presentation based upon their judgment as to what is important for the client 
to knoW. 28 Attorneys who adopt a paternalistic or "best interests" stance 
seek to determine what is in the client's "best interests" based upon their 
knowledge of the client and their own sense of what a client would ordinarily 
want under the circumstances. 29 Although this distinction may reflect 
important differences in emphasis, these "concepts are far more slippery and 
intertwined than the more categorical treatment has implied, and . . . 
relationships are far too complicated and contextual to allocate decision-
making power easily in one camp or the other. ,,30 
25. Practitioners and scholars who represent children wrestle with analogous questions. See, 
e.g., Manin Guggenheim. The Right To Be Represented But Not Heard: Reflections on Legal 
Representation for Children, 59 N.Y.V. L. REV. 76 (1984); lean Koh Peters, The Roles and 
Content of Best Interests in Client-Directed lAwyering for Children in Child Protective Proceedings, 
64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1505 (1996); Spinak, supra note 3, at 2005. 
26. See PETER 1. STRAUSS ET AL., AGING AND THE LAW 14-15 (1990). For a leading anicle 
on formulating a conception of paternalism, see David Luban, Paternalism and the Legal 
Profession, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 454. 
27. See William H. Simon, lAwyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones's Case, 50 MD. 
L. REV. 213,222-26 (1991); see also Tremblay, supra note 19, at 1442. 
28. See Simon, supra note 27, at 217-18. 
29. See id. 
30. Tremblay, supra note 19, at 1442. See also Herr, supra note 7, at 618 ("there are 
tremendous obstacles to constructing coherent attorney roles in even narrow contexts" among 
"disabled" populations). But see Mark Spiegel. The Case of Mrs. Jones Revisited: Paternalism and 
Autonomy in lAwyer-Client Counseling, 94 BYV L. REV. 307 (1997) (arguing that theoretical 
distinctions remain between paternalism and autonomy). 
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C. The Contextual Turn 
The result of these debates has been a recent turn away frorn the dualities 
of "cornpetence" /"incornpetence" and "autonorny" /"best interests" towards 
"contextual" and "situational" analyses. 31 For example, Jan Ellen Rein 
proposes to rnove "beyond the cornpetency construct" by expanding the 
factors attorneys should consider when determining whether to rnake 
decisions on behalf of questionably competent clients.32 Rein argues that 
while attorneys should ordinarily and unequivocally take direction from their 
clients about the course of representation, there is an exception: 
"interference with individual decision-making is warranted . . . to protect 
third party or societal interests when, in the particular situation, they are of 
higher social irnportance than untrammeled decision-rnaking itself. ,,33 Peter 
Margulies offers an alternative conception of how attorneys should approach 
representing the elderly of questionable capacity. 34 Margulies argues that 
attorneys faced with such clients should consider how to rnaxirnize the "core 
values" of providing access to legal services, fostering connection arnong the 
elderly by representing groups cornprised of the elderly, and letting "the 
client's voice be heard. ,,35 
Both Rein and Margulies thus ernbrace a rnore "situational" and 
"contextual" approach. In so doing, they reject the over-simplified 
dichotomies of competence/incompetence and autonornylbest interests. In its 
place, they propose a series of factors that lawyers should consider when 
representing clients of questionable competence. 
31. These movements toward context reflect broader trends. For example, some recent 
clinical literature has argued that attorneys need to examine the subtleties of a client's context-both 
individual and social-while rejecting more universal, abstract conceptions of attorney/client 
interactions. See, e.g., Dinerstein, supra note 2, at 719; Leslie G. Espinoza, Legal Narratives, 
Therapeutic Narratives: The Invisibility and Omnipresence of Race and Gender, 95 MICH. L. REV. 
901,909,936 (1997); Ann Shalleck, Constructions of the Client Within Legal Education, 45 STAN. 
L. REV. 1731, 1739-40 (1993) [hereinafter Constructions of the Client]; Ann Shalleck, Theory and 
Experience in Constructing the Relationship Between the lAwyer and Client: Representing Women 
Who Have Been Abused, 64 TENN. L. REV. 1019, 1039 n.97 (1997) [hereinafter Theory and 
Experience]. Such trends, in turn, echo the importance of "context" in other realms of legal 
scholarship and in philosophical currents such as pragmatism and postmodernism. See, e.g., Phyllis 
Goldfarb, Beyond Cut Flowers: Developing a Clinical Perspective on Critical Legal Theory, 43 
HASTINGS LJ. 717, 739-47 (1992); Martha Minow & Elizabeth Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1597 (1990). 
32. See Rein, supra note 12, at 1162-75. 
33. Id. at 1165. This perspective resonates with feminist crlttques of the concept of 
"autonomy" when a client'S autonomy interferes with the autonomy of unrepresented individuals or 
groups. See Deborah L. Rhode, Gender and Professional Roles, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 39,48-49 
(1994). 
34. See Margulies, supra note 18. 
35. Id. at 1076-80. 
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Margulies' access, connection and voice, and Rein's autonomy and social 
interests furnish important categories for analysis. However, setting aside 
questions about the value of their particular analyses and those of others-
questions that tend to dominate the academic discourse in this area-an 
important question remains regardless of which factors one chooses: how do 
people go about constructing the meaning that gets plugged into these 
factors? For example, how do we construe, under Rein's analysis, a client's 
"untrammeled decision making" or, under Margulies' analysis, what "the 
client's voice" is? After all, a central insight of clinical theory is that 
underlying facts and the ends and means of representation are not pieces of 
data prepackaged for examination, but are constructed by attorneys and 
clients. 36 Moreover, this construction inevitably involves building upon 
assumptions about how the world works. If it were otherwise, life would be, 
in William James' phrase, "a bloomin' buzzin' confusion. ,,37 
A great deal of important work in a variety of disciplines. has explored the 
critical issues surrounding such "construction of meaning. ,,38 Social 
psychologists, for example, have demonstrated that human beings are 
"cognitive conservatives," that is, our minds tend to interpret facts to be 
consistent with what we already believe, and these interpretations are often 
guided by assumptions and stereotypes. 39 Legal commentators have also 
36. See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education-A 21st Century 
Perspective, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 612, 614-15 (1984). 
37. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 113 (1970) (quoting 
William James). Stanley Fish has articulated this idea in another way: "To imagine a world with no 
background in place, with no prearticulation of the directions one might take, is to imagine a world 
where there would be literally nowhere to go, where, since every path would be the same path, the 
notion of doing this rather than that-of acting freely-would be empty." STANLEY FISH, DOING 
WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY 
AND LEGAL STUDIES, 459 (1989). The preeminent proponent of this view in the Western 
philosophical tradition is Ludwig Wittgenstein, who called such assumptions "forms of life." 
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 85,217 (1958). 
38. JEROME BRUNER, ACTS OF MEANING 4 (1990) (emphasis omitted). 
39. For example, through "confirmation bias," humans "manage knowledge in a variety of 
ways to promote the selective availability of information that confirms judgments already arrived 
at." Anthony G. Greenwald, The Totalitarian Ego: Fabrication and Revision of Personal History, 
35 AM. PSYCHOL. 603, 606 (1980). Through "biased hypothesis testing," we subject evidence 
supporting hypotheses with which we do not agree to greater scrutiny than evidence supporting 
hypotheses with which we do agree. See, e.g., Lord et aI., Considering the Opposite: A Corrective 
Strategy for Social Judgment, 47 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1231, 1232 (1984). For a 
review of the different processes that social psychologists have identified as contributing to these 
tendencies, see Robert Rubinson, The Polyphonic Counroom: Expanding the Possibilities of Judicial 
Discourse, 101 DICK. L. REV. 3, 27-29 (1996). For influential inquiries that explore the 
construction of meaning in other disciplines, see generally CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE 
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES (1973) (anthropology); MIKHAIL BAKHTlN, THE DIALOGIC 
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explored how stock stories and stereotypes often control the construction of 
and justification for ostensibly "neutral" legal principles.40 
The next three parts of this article investigate how a single, pervasive 
assumption about the elderly-the idea of decrement-exerts a profound 
influence on how attorneys and the elderly construe competence and 
communicate with each other. 
III. THE IDEA OF DECREMENT 
Assumptions abound about the elderly. Many are negative: for example, 
the elderly are grouchy, unsociable, and sexually inactive. 41 Some are more 
"positive": for example, the elderly are more "experienced" and better 
storytellers.42 However, one assumption about the elderly is espeCially 
preeminent: aging entails a "progressive decline in health or competence. ,,43 
This view conceptualizes health and competence as an "inverted U" over 
time, with a steadily increasing level of competence from childhood until 
adulthood, with a steadily decreasing level thereafter until reaching, once 
again, a level comparable to that of a child. 44 This is "the idea of 
decrement. ,,45 
IMAGINATION (Michael Holquist ed., Caryl Emerson & Michael Holquist trans., 1981) (literary 
theory); WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 37 (philosophy). 
40. See, e.g., Peggy Cooper Davis, The Proverbial Woman, 48 REC. ASS'N B. CITY N.Y. 7 
(1993); Martha Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term: Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. 
L. REV. 10 (1987); Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Motherhood: Conflicting Definitions from 
Welfare "Reform," Family, and Criminal Law, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 688 (1998). 
41. See NIKOLAS COUPLAND ET AL., LANGUAGE, SOCIETY AND THE ELDERLY 133 (1991). 
42. See MICHAEL W. PRATT & JOAN E. NORRIS, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF AGING 87 
(1994). 
43. COUPLAND ET AL., supra note 41, at 3. This focus also tends to dominate empirical 
research about the elderly. See id. at 7-8. 
44. Id. at 12. 
45. I have chosen to use the terminology adopted by COUPLAND ET AL., supra note 41. 
Although not always called "decrement," this stereotype is often described in the literature on aging 
and gerontology. See, e.g., Carroll L. Estes, The Aging Enterprise Revisited, 33 GERONTOLOGIST 
292, 292 (1993) (a social "construction of reality is that the aging process is one of biological, 
physiological, and cognitive decline"); H.B. GIBSON, THE EMOTIONAL AND SEXUAL LIVES OF 
OLDER PEOPLE 55 (1992) ("The stereotype that younger people, both professional and lay, have of 
aging includes a false model of deterioration over time. "); George Banziger & Jean Drevenstedt, 
Achievement Attributions by Young and Old Judges as a Function of Perceived Age of Stimulus 
Person, 37 J. GERONTOLOGY 468, 468 (1982) ("stereotypically ... old age [is] associated with a 
perceived diminution of competency"); Marie R. Haug & Marcia G. Dry, Issues in Elderly Patient-
Provider Interactions, 9 RES. ON AGING 3, 6 (1987) (noting social stereotype which "Iump[s] all 
those 65 and over into one category and characteriz[es] all older people as in declining or ill health . 
. . and doomed to senility"). Even Shakespeare's Dogberry notes in MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING, 
act 3, sc. 5, that "[w]hen the age is in, the wit is out." 
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The pervasiveness of the idea of decrement is extraordinary. It surfaces 
in popular culture, such as jokes and birthday cards which invoke the 
decremental effects of aging.46 It arises in categories that link age with 
physical or cognitive challenges: Medicare, for example, is called "Health 
Insurance for Aged and Disabled, ,,47. and Social Security is called "Income 
for Aged, Blind, and Disabled. ,,48 Binder, Bergman and Price construct a 
similar category by devoting a portion of a chapter on "atypical and difficult 
clients" to "communicating with aged and infirm clients. ,,49 
This idea of decrement also controls discourse with and about the elderly. 
For example, a statement such as "my grandmother is eighty-six, but she's 
still sharp as a tack" embodies a norm of decrement: the relationship 
between the two variables underlying the statement-age and mental 
competence-would not be significant unless most eighty-six-year-olds were 
not believed to be "sharp as a tack. "so Such statements that confirm how 
"with it" an elderly person is reaffirm the norm. 
Moreover, as elaborated in more detail below, SI the idea of decrement 
operates with particular force when an elderly person does not exhibit 
specific behavior that undermines age-related stereotypes. For example, the 
"sharp as a tack" eighty-six year old will likely be judged favorably as 
"remarkable for her age," but a "normal" eighty-six year old wiIllikely be 
judged to be consistent with the full range of assumptions underlying the idea 
of decrement. S2 
46. See GIBSON, supra note 45, at 73; Iudith Rodin & Ellen Langer, Aging Labels: The 
Decline of Control and the Fall of Self-Esteem, I. SOC. ISSUES, Spring 1980, at 12, 13. 
47. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1991). 
48. Id. § 1381. Linking together these three groups reveals other stereotypes, such as the 
blind not being "fully able." Surveys have also found that many state statutes link age with 
incompetence or infirmity. See Whitton, supra note 11, at 477-78. It has been argued that the very 
existence of such "age-segregated categorical services" fosters the perception thaI aging is a uniform 
"problem" that requires governmental intervention. See Estes, supra note 45, at 292. 
49. BINDER ET AL., supra nOle I, at 245. Although including the caveat that "not every older 
person will have difficulty recalling and conveying information," the thrust of the section is that 
"[cJommon barriers to satisfactory communication include advanced age and medical intirmity." 
[d. 
50. The impact of the norm of decrement on discourse will be addressed in more detail in 
Part V. See infra text accompanying notes 117-146. 
51. See infra text accompanying notes 95-96. 
52. See Ellen Bouchard Ryan & Rochelle L. Cole, Evaluative Perceptions of Interpersonal 
Communication with Elders, in COMMUNICATION, HEALTH AND THE ELDERLY 172, 177 (Howard 
Giles et at. eds., 1990). For a theoretical discussion of the possible operation of this process, see 
V.A. Braithwaite, Old Age Stereotypes: Reconciling Contradictions, 41 I. GERONTOLOGY 353, 358 
(1986). Braithwaite speculates that when an elderly person does not exhibit the stereotyped 
characteristics of decrement, the person "exceeds expectations" and thus is judged more favorably. 
See id. 
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It is undeniable that aging sometimes undermines aspects of physical and 
mental health. However, even apart from mounting evidence that these 
effects are reversible far more often than generally recognized,S) the idea of 
decrement vastly simplifies the complex processes affecting an 
extraordinarily large and diverse group of individuals. S4 In fact, wholesale 
mental and physical decrement is not an inevitable part of the aging process. 
Instead of progressive decline, the vast majority of "older people functionO 
at much the same level over quite a long period of time, suffering the usual 
ups and downs of health that are experienced at all ages, but not 
deteriorating as is popularly supposed. "55 Put simply, the vast majority of 
the aged are sharp as a tack and do not suffer from a progressive decline in 
competence. S6 
The ultimate point is a simple one: the category "elderly" is a social 
construction. 57 The notion that the "elderly" embody an inevitable 
decremental process is "inevitable" only insofar as members of society-
young and old and in-between-take it as the "truth" and define themselves 
and their relations with others in terms of it. 58 
Needless to say, the idea of decrement affects the attorney/elderly client 
relationship. At the broadest level, the idea of decrement-like all 
stereotypes-promotes a homogenized discourse about, with, and by the 
53. See infra text accompanying notes 73-77. 
54. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Frolik & Alison P. Barnes, An Aging Population: A Challenge to 
the Law, 42 HASTINGS LJ. 683, 690 (1991). 
55. GIBSON, supra note 45, at 56. This is also true of physical functions even after a 
disabling episode like a stroke. See Thomas M. Gill et aI., Predictors of Recovery in Activities of 
Daily Living Among Disabled Older Persons Living in the Community, 12 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 
757 (1997). 
56. A range of statistics support this point. To take just a few: 1) only two to four percent of 
the population over sixty-five have Alzheimer's Disease, see AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOC., 
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 137 (4th ed. 1994); 2) severe 
psychotic disorders are less prevalent among the elderly than among the non-elderly, see Linda F. 
Smith, Representing the Elderly Client and Addressing the Question of Competence, 14 J. 
CONTEMP. L. 61, 68 (1988); 3) Ninety-five percent of persons over sixty-five and eighty percent of 
persons over eighty are not affected by significant cognitive impairment, see Robert P. Roca, 
Determining Decisional Capacity: A Medical Perspective, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1177, 1181 
(1994). 
57. See Estes, supra note 45, at 292; Whitton, supra note 11, at 456 n.4. The influential idea 
of "social construction" is usually associated with the intellectual movement called " post-
structuralism." For a famous example of post-structuralist analysis, see MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE 
HISTORY OF SEXUALITY VOLUME 1: AN INTRODUCTION (Robert Hurley trans., 1990). 
58. The idea of decrement reverberates in social policy as well. There is, for example, the 
usually implicit notion that the old have lived their lives, and thus their increasing medical and 
emotional needs are less legitimate than the needs of other segments of society. See, e.g., GIBSON, 
supra note 45, at 60. 
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elderly which screens out "dissonant and nonconforming concepts. ,,59 There 
is a pervasive social presumption in favor of declining competence among 
the elderly and, as a result, attorneys and the population at large-including 
the elderly themselves-construct meaning in line with this assumption. 60 
IV. THE INTERNALIZATION OF THE IDEA OF DECREMENT 
A. Attorneys 
Legal scholars have observed how attorney perceptions of clients are 
influenced by stereotypes. 61 It should come as no surprise, given the 
centrality of the idea of decrement, that attorneys who interact with elderly 
clients risk interpreting their clients' behavior as demonstrating cognitive 
decline. 62 
1. Interpreting Behavior as Demonstrating Declining Competence 
The influence of the idea of decrement highlights mental decline as the 
"obvious" explanation for the behavior of an elderly client.63 Thus, lawyers 
59. Peggy C. Davis, Contextual Legal Criticism: A Demonstration Exploring Hierarchy and 
'Feminine' Style, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1635, 1643 (1991). For some of the processes identified by 
social psychologists that contribute to this process, see supra text accompanying notes 38-40. 
60. For a historical overview of this and other assumptions about aging and how they have 
changed over time, see W. Andrew Achenbaum, Societal Perceptions of Aging and the Aged, in 
HANDBOOK OF AGING & THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 129 (Robert H. Binstock & Ethel Shanas eds., 2d 
ed. 1985); Whitton, supra note 11, at 458-63. 
61. See, e.g., Michelle S. Jacobs, People from the Footnotes: The Missing Element in Client-
Centered Counseling, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 345, 377~91 (1997) (describing the influence of 
race on an attorney's perceptions of African-American clients); Lucie E. White, Subordinotion, 
Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 
1, 45-48 (1990) (describing the influence of socioeconomic status on attorney's view of client); see 
also Bill Ong Hing, Raising Personal Identification Issues of Class, Race, Ethnicity, Gender, Sexual 
Orientation, Physical Disability, and Age in Lawyering Courses, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1807, 1809-11 
(1993) (noting the impact of class, race, ethnicity, age, and other "personal identitication issues" in 
attorney lei ient interactions). 
62. In this and in succeeding discussions, I focus on "intergroup discourse" between elderly 
clients and younger attorneys because such discourse illustrates in an especially stark way the 
influence of stereotypes about the elderly. I do not mean to suggest, however, that the elderly do 
not or should not practice law. 
63. There have been empirical demonstrations of this effect. See, e.g., Rodin & Langer, 
supra note 46, at 17-18 (reporting that subjects viewed forgetful behavior by an older person more 
negatively than comparable forgetful behavior by a younger person). These effects are a 
consequence of the human tendency towards "confirmation bias" and "biased fact assimilation." 
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often will assume that elderly clients have experienced declining 
competence, and attorneys often will seemingly-but mistakenly-find what 
they are looking for. 64 
A well-documented example of this phenomenon is the interpretation of 
forgetfulness among the elderly. Even though it is hardly unusual for people 
of any age to be forgetful about minutiae such as names, places, and 
telephone numbers, forgetfulness among the elderly may take on the more 
sinister cast of creeping senility. 65 Given the strong link between memory 
and prevailing social conceptions of competence, forgetfulness-
unremarkable in and of itself-may suddenly be transformed into the 
assumption that an elderly person is "losing it.,,66 
In addition, when counseling an elderly client, lawyers often assume that 
idiosyncratic decisions are the result of incompetence. 67 Another 
interpretation might seem less obvious when interacting with the elderly: 
idiosyncrasy might be idiosyncrasy. After all, many non-elderly lead lives in 
ways that stray from the norm, and these non-elderly might well be seen not 
as incompetent, but as original or bold. 68 
Moreover, an inevitable byproduct of this phenomenon is that, like 
Sherlock Holmes once observed, "we do not consider especially informative 
See supra text accompanying notes 38-40; see also Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego and 
Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 338-39 (1987) ("In 
ambiguous social situations, it will always be easier to find evidence supporting an individual's 
assumed group characteristics than to find contradictory evidence. "). 
64. This kind of behavior was found in an experiment in which psychotherapists were 
presented with two case studies describing pathological behavior. See Rodin & Langer, supra note 
46, at 19. The only significant difference between the two descriptions were the ages of the 
subjects: one was described as young, the other in his or her sixties and seventies. The 
psychotherapists "showed a greater propensity to diagnose the same psychotic behavior as 
organically based when the individual was old rather than young." Id. A similar study involving 
less serious pathology found that psychotherapists far more frequently recommended treatment 
involving drugs and institutionalization for older subjects. See id. 
65. See PRATT & NORRIS, supra note 42, at 87-88. 
66. See id. at 87-88. This is not a new observation. Dr. Samuel Johnson noted that "[iJf a 
young man or a middle-aged man, when leaving a company, does not recollect where he laid his 
hat, it is nothing. But if the same inattention is discovered in an old man, people shrug their 
shoulders and say his memory is going." SIEGFRIED KRA, AGING MYTHS: REVERSIBLE CAUSES OF 
MIND AND MEMORY Loss 4 (1986). 
67. See Rein, supra note 12, at 1126; Rosoff & Gottlieb, supra note 20, at 29-30. 
68. A useful thought experiment might be to ask whether an elderly person's action would 
appear to be irrational if performed by a non-elderly person. See Whitton, supra note 11, at 455. 
This strategy recalls Charles Lawrence's suggestion about how changing "I don't think of you as a 
Negro" into "I don't think of you as white" demonstrates the racism of the first statement. 
Lawrence, supra note 63, at 341-42; see also Peter Margulies, The Mother with Poor Judgment and 
Other Tales of the Unexpected: A Civil Republican View of Difference and Clinical Legal Education, 
88 Nw. U. L. REV. 695, 727 (1994) (suggesting that a teacher "[a]sk students if they would have a 
different view of [a poor client's] decision if she were a network anchorperson or a lawyer"). 
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the fact that the dog did not bark during the night. ,,69 Thus, elderly clients 
might engage in a range of perfectly ordinary behavior. Nevertheless, this 
"normal" behavior may remain invisible while the occasional memory lapse 
or distracted speech stands out as confirming deciining competence. 70 
There is a final manifestation of this phenomenon that deserves mention. 
A range of common problems among the elderly might hamper their ability 
to communicate. Decreased tongue maneuverability, dry mouth, and 
hearing loss all may impede communication. 71 Given the homogenizing 
influence of the idea of decrement, it is likely that such symptoms-entirely 
unrelated to mental competence-might lead to an utterly unfounded 
conclusion of mental impairment. 72 
2. Actualism 
An "actualist" stance holds that only the actual is possible.73 What this 
means is that certain admittedly "actual" impairments-such as memory 
loss-are viewed as fixed and irreversible, and thus only subject to further 
deterioration. The possibility that this "actual" state is temporary or 
reversible disappears from consideration. 74 
In fact, as documented by an enormous body of medical and social 
science literature, there are numerous causes of symptoms like memory loss 
unrelated to irreversible, organic cognitive decline.7' For example, 
malnutrition, depression, high or low blood pressure, slow pulse rate, 
chemical and blood deficiencies, and, most importantly, medications all can 
cause memory loss.76 Similarly, "social isolation, transportation problems, 
[and] financial insecurity . . . all worsen the functional capacity of older 
69. Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, The Adventures of Silver Bloze (1892), cited in Lord, supra note 
39, at 1239. 
70. See, e.g., Ryan & Cole, supra note 52, at 178 ("there is considerable likelihood that 
competent behaviours of older adults will be under-utilised in forming the first impressions so 
critical to initial and subsequent encounters"). 
71. See Goodenough, supra note 16, at 56. See also Haug & Ory, supra note 45, at 26. 
These conditions afflicted the ninety-year-old client I described above. See supra text accompanying 
notes 6-8. 
72. See, e.g., Ryan & Cole, supra note 52, at 179. 
73. I have borrowed this term from Daniel C. Dennett. See DENNETf, supra note 17, at 260. 
74. Such a stance reflects the emphasis among gerontologists on accommodative as opposed 
to restorative approaches in analyzing the needs of the elderly. See Estes, supra note 45, at 294. 
75. See generally KRA, supra note 66; Ellen Bouchard Ryan, Beliefs About Memory Changes 
Across the Adult Life Span, 471. GERONTOLOGY: PSYCHOL. SCI. P41 (1992). 
76. See generally KRA, supra note 66. 
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people. ,,77 Obviously, attorneys are not qualified to medically examine 
clients to determine possible causes of mental impairment or memory loss, 
but the possibility of reversible causes might have an enormous impact on 
how attorneys construct their interpretation of the mental states of the 
elderly. 
3. The Complexity of Competence 
The idea of decrement not only homogenizes a diverse population, but 
also an extraordinarily complex idea: cognitive functioning. 78 In addition to 
contributing to the continuing misconception that competence is a definable, 
either/or proposition,79 the idea of decrement also presumes that cognitive 
impairment in one area signifies cognitive impairment in all areas. This is 
especially true of memory 10SS,80 which (assuming it is permanent) does not 
necessarily mean that the client cannot function in other domains or is 
incapable of carrying on meaningful conversation.81 
Moreover, an elderly patient who suffers an organic loss of short-term 
memory because of a stroke or other illness may deny that such a loss has 
occurred. 82 The client may thus construct a fantasy that fills in blanks left by 
an impaired memory. For example, if a client does not recognize or has 
forgotten that she is hospitalized, she may say, "this is a jail-I have to break 
out. " However, even though she misidentifies her location, her attitude 
towards her location-her plainly stated desire to leave it-is unequivocal. 83 
In other words, the client does view the hospital as the equivalent of jail, and 
her notion that it is a jail literalizes a metaphor that a non-impaired person 
might employ. This attitude is real, and, at a minimum, should not be 
summarily discounted as the mere product of an impaired mental state. 
77. Howard Waitzkin et aI., Narratives of Aging and Social Problems in Medical Encounters 
with Older Persons. 35 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 322, 342 (1994). One researcher concluded 
that 75% of the disabilities of the elderly are "sociogenic," that is, the result of social attitudes and 
stigmatization. ALEX COMFORT, A GOOD AGE 140 (1976). 
78. See supra text accompanying notes 14-18. 
79. See supra text accompanying notes 15-17. 
80. As previously noted, conventional wisdom considers memory to be a foundation of 
competence. See supra text accompanying notes 66-67. See also PRATf & NORRIS, supra note 42, 
at 87-88. 
81. See WetJe, supra note 16, at 264. For example, even the 2-4% of the population over 65 
who suffer from Alzheimer's Disease first experience impairment only of "short-term memory and 
concentration, while sparing long-term memory, values, convictions, and personality." Rosoff & 
Gottlieb, supra note 20, at 7. 
82. See Smith, supra note 56, at 71. 
83. See id. 
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4. "I'm Not Impaired, So The Client Must Be" 
The idea of decrement implies a gulf between the elderly client and the 
younger, presumably more "with it" attorney. This leads to a process best 
described by a cartoon in which one figure says to the other: "Senile 
dementia? Isn't that when elderly clients disagree with you about what's best 
for them?,,84 
This cartoon captures a classic error on the part of those who work with 
the elderly, including attorneys: any disagreements about what is best for a 
client are not "real" disagreements because the client's position must be 
distorted by mental impairment. 85 Thus, the idea of decrement furnishes a 
particularly "logical" interpretation of client intransigence. 86 
This line of reasoning plays out in many contexts. For example, some 
elderly clients relish the safety of not making decisions. 87 Such a client 
might willingly cede decision-making responsibility to an attorney, family 
member, friend, or member of the clergy. 88 This is not to say, of course, 
that an attorney should accept such a delegation at face value, particularly 




Reproduced in BERNARD INEICHEN, SENILE DEMENTIA: POLICY AND SERVICES (1989). 
For a discussion of "paternalism" under such circumstances, see Luban, supra note 26, at 
86. Anthony Alfieri alludes to a related phenomenon when he describes how "[p]overty 
lawyers fail to apprehend the meaning of their clients' struggles, preferring to search client 
character for evidence of pathology." Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: 
Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107, 2134 n.96 (1991). 
87. This tendency might be related to the importance that dependency has on the elderly. See 
infra text accompanying notes 115-16. 
88. William H. Simon describes a case which illustrates this point. See Simon, supra note 
27, at 214-16. Simon represented a sixty-tive-year-old woman in a criminal case involving a traffic 
accident. Despite Simon's best efforts, the client and her minister insisted that Simon was "the 
expert," and thus should tell her what to do. See id. at 215. 
One study found that at least in doctor-patient interactions, older people are significantly more 
likely to defer to authority than younger people. See Marie Haug, Doctor Patient Relationships and 
the Older Patient, 34 J. GERONTOLOGY 852, 854-57 (1979) (elderly found to have "greater 
adherence to traditional authority relationships"). One explanation for such deference is that the 
elderly are from a "societal milieu" which fostered "an unquestioning belief in physician altruistic 
expertise" and "respect for authority." Marie R. Haug, Elderly Patients, Caregivers, and 
Physicians: Theory and Research on Health Care Triads, 35 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. I, 2-4 
(1994). It is thus possible that some clients-especially elderly clients-are particularly comfortable 
with the "professional in charge" paradigm that is anathema to the conception of lawyering as 
"client-centered." See Haug & Ory, supra note 45, at 29-30 (some elderly patients "could 
conceivably be more comfortable with the 'old-fashioned' familiar style of 'doctor in charge'"). 
However, there are obvious dangers in ascribing a unitary "social milieu" to a large of group of 
people of strikingly different backgrounds. See Howard Giles et aI., Communication, Health and 
the Elderly: Frameworks, Agenda and a Model, in COMMUNICATION, HEALTH AND THE ELDERLY 
I, 10 (Howard Giles et al. eds., 1990) ("the elderly emanate from different historical periods with 
their own cohorts, values and predispositions"). 
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at the same time, an attorney should not assume that "impairment" is the 
only, or even primary, explanation for this behavior. 
Along the same lines, it seems inconceivable that a client might wish to 
stay in a filthy apartment, cohabitate with an exploitive relative, or otherwise 
prefer the status quo when potentially available alternatives seem 
economically and qualitatively superior. However, some elderly individuals 
are acutely vulnerable to environmental instability. 89 Given the accumulating 
losses of income, friends, relatives, and occupation, these clients may relish 
stability-however seemingly ill-advised or trivial-wherever and however 
they find it. 90 In this light, it is possible that such behavior might be 
perfectly "rational" and "competent" under the client's circumstances. 
B. The Elderly Client 
The elderly are an extraordinarily diverse population. Each elderly 
person, like everyone else, has a unique set of life experiences and a unique 
personality. This is always critical to keep in mind: when describing groups, 
such as the elderly, that are the subject of stereotyping, there is always the 
risk of replacing one stereotype-here the idea of decrement-with another 
equally misleading and simplified stereotype, such as the idea that all elderly 
are fully competent and healthy. 91 This raises the inevitable difficulty of, as 
Deborah Rhode has put it, "theorizing from experience without 
homogenizing it. ,,92 Even with this caveat, it is nevertheless critical to study 
patterns that emerge across categories of individuals, such as the elderly, as 
a means to examine social domination and stereotyping. 93 
In fact, the idea of decrement influences many elderly clients as well as 
attorneys, even to the extent of sometimes creating "real" behavior that, in 
the end, generates mental impairment.94 While not all elderly clients will 
uniformly internalize the idea of decrement and some react against "elderly 
89. See Howard B. Gelt, Psychological Considerations in Representing the Aged Client, 17 
ARIZ. L. REV. 293, 300 (1975). See also Haug & Dry, supra note 45, at 14 (noting "the salience 
of person-environmenr tit in the elderly's sense of well-being"). 
90. See Gelt, supra note 89, at 300-01. 
91. See. e.g., Theory and Experience, supra note 31, at 1023 (arguing that the construct 
"battered woman" submerges the complex and tluid circumstances of victims of domestic abuse into 
"a single, uniform experience"); Altieri, supra note 86, at 2122 (arguing against "an essenrialist 
vision of the voices and narratives of impoverished clients" even when inconsistent with prevailing 
narratives). 
92. Rhode, supra note 33, at 42. 
93. See White, supra note 5, at 1504, 1506 (arguing for inquiry into "recurring patterns of 
domination" as well as a more Foucauhian focus on the "microdynamics of everyday life"). 
94. See infra text accompanying notes 98-116. 
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identity roles and styles and deny stereotypic attributions in their own and in 
others' talk, ,,95 some elderly clients will internalize the idea of decrement and 
thus "sound, look, feel, think, and act older. "96 It is these clients who are 
especially at risk of appearing incompetent. 97 
1. The Elderly Client's Internalization of the Idea of Decrement 
Stereotypes influence the thoughts and self-image of the targets of 
stereotypes. Recent studies have detailed how insidious and pervasive these 
effects can be. For example, Claude Steele's work on a process he calls 
"stereotype vulnerability" demonstrates that victims o( stereotypes have a 
tendency to perform in accordance with the expectations generated by the 
stereotypes.98 Legal scholars also have explored similar ideas, especially in 
the areas of race and gender. 99 
It is extraordinarily difficult for the elderly to avoid internalizing ideas 
about cognitive decline. The elderly often navigate through a world 
consIstmg of the "aging enterprise" -the "programs, organizations, 
bureaucracies, interest groups, trade associations, providers, industries, and 
professionals that serve the aged in one capacity or another." 100 This 
"enterprise" has a profound impact on how the elderly view themselves and 
the world. Although it is unfair to indict the whole enterprise as ageist, 
much of this enterprise seeks to accommodate the purported progressive 
decline of aging as opposed to restoring the quality of life of the elderly. 101 
In this, the "aging enterprise" embodies the idea of decrement. 
95. Giles et aI., supra note 88, at 11. 
96. Id. at 10. See also Elias S. Cohen, The Elderly Mystique: Constraints on the Autonomy of 
the Elderly with Disabilities. GERONTOLOGIST, Supp. June, 1988, at 24 (in some settings, "the 
elderly themselves have bought into an elderly mystique which holds that the potentials for growth, 
development. and continuing engagement vinually disappear"); Ryan, supra note 75, at P41 (stating 
the cognitive function of some elderly diminish because of low social expectations). 
97. See supra text accompanying note 52. 
98. See, e.g., Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual 
Test Performance of African Americans, 69 I. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 797, 808 (1995). 
99. See Jacobs, supra note 61, at 378-79 (describing research exploring how expectations 
induce the objects of those expectations to act in accordance with them); Deborah L. Rhode, 
Perspectives on Professional Women, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1163, 1189 (1988) (stating "[a]s both 
experimental and longitudinal studies have repeatedly demonstrated, low expectations of 
achievement frequently become self-fulfilling prophecies."); Theory and Experience, supra note 31, 
at 1056 (noting that a victim of domestic violence "herself may be affected by the understandings of 
domestic violence that she finds in the legal system and the rest of her world"). For a probing 
examination of the internalization of oppression, see Lucie E. White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons 
from Driefontein on Lawyering and Power, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 699. 
100. CARROLL L. ESTES, THE AGING ENTERPRISE 2 (1979). 
101. See Estes, supra note 45, at 294. 
3'1: 121] CLIENT COMPETENCE 141 
Moreover, the home life of some elderly persons fosters a sense of 
~dependency and helplessness: 
In some families, all responsibilities and chores are taken away 
from the elderly patient. He or she no longer has to make 
decisions or be concerned about planning a meal. This can happen 
in a home environment and to a greater extent in a nursing home. 
When one is shut into a silent world surrounded by people of the 
same generation and having no outside stimuli, there is no necessity 
to use one's memory or the imaginative or constructive instinct of 
earlier years. 102 
The elderly may thus view themselves in line with prevailing stereotypes, 
especially the idea of decrement. 103 A simple manifestation of this will likely 
be familiar: although it is rare for adults to mention their age in ordinary 
conversation, the elderly do so regularly. 104 One study found many 
examples, such as "well I'm almost eighty and I can't expect much. ,,105 This 
recalls the "my grandmother is eighty-six, but she's still sharp as a tack" 
example discussed earlier. 106 As with that earlier statement, age disclosure 
among the elderly reflects an assumed link between advanced chronological 
age and physical and emotional decline. The prevalent of such age 
disclosure demonstrates that many elderly construe their own well-being in 
terms of the idea that aging is a decremental process. 107 
2. Consequences 
While, at a minimum, the idea of decrement is a significant challenge to 
older people's morale and confidence,108 its potential consequences are 
pervasive. 
Memory Loss-The non-elderly are not alone in interpreting forgetfulness 
among the elderly client as manifesting cognitive decline; the elderly may do 
the same thing. 109 As one researcher has put it, "[a]ge-based memory beliefs 
may sensitize older persons to be more aware of the same everyday memory 
failures that they have experienced all their lives. ,,110 Especially when 
102. KRA, supra note 66, at 4. 
103. See Rodin & Langer, supra note 46, at 15; Cohen, supra note 96, at 24. 
104. See COUPLAND ET AL. supra note 41, at 59. 
105. Id. at 138 
106. See supra text accompanying note 50. 
107. See COUPLAND ET AL., supra note 41, at 150. 
108. See id. at 24; Estes, supra note 45, at 293; Ryan, supra note 75, at P41. 
109. See supra text accompanying notes 65-66. 
110. Ryan, supra note 75, at P41. 
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coupled with the lack of stimulation that afflicts the day to day lives of some 
elderly people, this "reality" becomes reality, and there really can be 
memory loss. III Such memory loss, however, is not organic, and may be 
remedied by correcting situational factors contributing to these problems. II? 
Helplessness-A primary component of the idea of decrement is its 
purported inevitability. In the face of this, some elderly may. "see 
themselves as unable to manage their environment" which, in turn, promotes 
feelings of helplessness and loss of control. 113 Some elderly people attribute 
problems to the irreparable ravages of age, and not to specific situations 
which may be. subject to change. 114 Such an attribution has important 
consequences for an attorney/client relationship: attorneys are situational 
problem-definers and problem-solvers, and elderly clients might thus view 
lawyers (and everyone else) as powerless to stem the inevitable emergence of 
age-related problems. 
Dependency- Related to the notion of helplessness is that some elderly 
view themselves as dependent upon others for their financial, physical, and 
emotional well-being. As with all aspects of a category as broad as 
"elderly," the degree of an individual client's dependency varies 
enormously. liS Nevertheless, perceived or actual dependency in certain 
realms may render elderly clients reluctant to offer their perspectives or to 
participate actively in their own representation. Such dependency is not 
necessarily inevitable but, rather, "an as yet undetermined (but significant) 
amount of dependency is modifiable, preventable, or reversible. ,,116 Such a 
culture of dependency renders some elderly clients reluctant to take the lead 
in offering their perspective and in structuring their own legal solutions. 
111. See ill. (asserting that "[IJower self-evaluations of memory. based in part on negative 
social expectations. can lead 10 poorer memory performance through their indirect impact on 
decreased effort. less use of adaptive strategies. avoidance of challenging situations. and failure to 
seek medical attention for disease-related symptoms of forgetfulness"); Rodin & Langer, supra note 
46, at 24-25. 
112. Rodin & Langer, supra note 46, at 24-26. 
113. John M. Wiemann et aI., Communication with the Elderly: Implications for Health Care 
and Social Suppon in COMMUNICATION, HEALTH AND THE ELDERLY 229 (Howard Giles et al. 
eds., 1990); Rodin & Langer, supra note 46, at 22-26. 
114. See, e.g., Haug & Ory, supra note 45, at 13 (explaining that as a result of "ageism," the 
elderly "may be apt to attribute many of their complaints to the inevitable results of old age"); 
WetJe, supra note 16, at 260 (describing "learned helplessness" among the elderly). 
115. See, e.g., Frolik & Barnes, supra note 54, at 698-703. 
116. Estes, supra note 45, at 293 (citations omitted). 
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V. THE DISCOURSE OF DECREMENT 
Any conversation between the elderly and younger interlocutors-like any 
conversation between two human beings-is an extraordinarily complex and 
dynamic process. It inevitably involves numerous strategies with varied and 
sometimes contradictory motivations which are, in turn, subject to diverse 
interpretations depending on the strategies and motivations of the person 
doing the listening. While "discourse analysis" focusing on the 
microdynamics of conversation recently has become the subject of serious 
inquiry in legal scholarship, 117 other scholars within the last decade also have 
engaged in groundbreaking explorations of "intergroup discourse" between 
the young and the 01d. 118 These analyses yield further insights into how the 
idea of decrement influences attorney/client interactions. 
A. "Overaccommodation" by Younger Interlocutors 
Given the assumption that the elderly are "relatively incompetent, slow, 
old-fashioned and inflexible,''' 19 younger interlocutors "frequently 
overaccommodate their speech to stereotyped expectations of an elder's 
communication needs, as opposed to actual needs. ,,120 The result is likely to 
be patronizing. The classic example is the use of "baby talk" when speaking 
to an elderly personl21-an explicit reinforcement of the assumption that old 
age is a "second childhood." However, even if not full-fledged baby talk, 
overaccommodation typically employs one or more modifications of 
"ordinary" discourse, such as "slower speech rate, exaggerated intonation, 
117. For application of "discourse analysis" to interactions between lawyers, clients, and (in 
some cases) judges, see JOHN M. CONLEY & WILLIAM M. Q'BARR, RULES VERSUS 
RELATIONSHIPS: THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF LEGAL DISCOURSE (1990); Davis, supra note 59, at 1635; 
Felstiner & Sarat, supra note 3; Gay Gellhorn et aI., Law and Language: An Interdisciplinary Study 
of Client Interviews, 1 CLINICAL L. REY. 245 (1994). Although the amount of such research is 
increasing, there is relatively little exploring attorney/client discourse in contrast to, for example, 
physician-patient interactions. See Gellhorn et aI., supra, at 247-48. For a review of discourse 
analysis and the related tields of inquiry that use it, see id. at 251-55. 
118. See, e.g., COUPLAND ET AL., supra note 41, 152-71; Justine Coupland & Nikolas 
Coupland, 'Old Age Doesn't Come Alone': Discursive Representations of Health-in-Aging In 
Geriatric Medicine, 39 INT'L J. AGING & HUMAN DEY. 81 (1994); Howard Waitzkin et aI., supra 
note 77, at 322. 
119. COUPLAND ET AL., supra note 41, at 31. 
120. Ryan & Cole, supra note 52, at 173; see also COUPLAND ET AL., supra note 41, at 31. 
121. Id. This conversational strategy retlects the "inverted U" model of mental competence 
over the lifespan. See supra text accompanying note 44. I employed this strategy when speaking to 
one of the elderly clients I described in Part I. See supra text accompanying notes 7-9. 
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use of high pitch, increased loudness, more repetitions, tag questions, altered 
pronoun use, and simplification of vocabulary and grammar. ,,122 
The impact of overaccommodation on an elderly interlocutor is often 
equivocal. Such "nurturing" talk might "convey warmth and caring" 
attributes which are usually valued by an elderly person. 123 At the same 
time, the same Client might view such talk as demeaning,,24 Moreover, the 
intent of such strategies is to foster communication, such overaccomodation 
might foster "a sense of helpless dependence" on the part of the elderly 
client,125 and thus promote dependence and feelings of incompetence. 126 
Indeed, one study showed that elders preferred speech to be "simple," but 
that simplification might, at the same time, be viewed as disrespectful or 
patronizing. 127 
B. Discursive Strategies by the Elderly 
Interactions are necessarily joint affairs, and focusing on the stereotypical 
assumptions of younger interlocutors overlooks how discourse is inevitably a 
negotiation of reality on the parts of all interlocutors. 128 In fact, elderly 
speakers employ strategies in conversation for a variety of reasons, and these 
strategies, in turn, often reinforce stereotypes about the decremental process 
of aging. 
1. Age-Marking and Self-Handicapping 
The elderly often "mark" themselves in conversation as members of a 
social category called "elderly." These conversational strategies will likely 
122. Ryan & Cole, supra note 52, at 173; see also COUPLAND ET AL., supra note 41, at 36. 
123. PRATT & NORRIS, supra note 42, at 176; Ryan & Cole, supra note 52, at 174, 184-85. 
124. See PRATT & NORRIS, supra note 42, at 176; Ryan & Cole, supra note 52, at 174, 184-
85. 
125. Ryan & Cole, supra note 52, at 187-188; see also Theory and Experience, supra note 31, 
at 1056-57 (describing how attorney/client interactions risk imposing on a victim of domestic 
violence "the understandings of domestic violence that she finds in the legal system and in the rest 
of her world"). 
126. See PRATT & NORRIS. supra note 42, at 176; Ryan & Cole, supra note 52, at 174. As 
one nursing home resident observed: "Why do you think the staff insists on talking baby talk when 
speaking to me? I understand English. I have a degree in music and am a cenitied teacher. Now I 
hear a lot of words that end in 'y.' Is this how my kids felt? My hearing aid works tine. There is 
little need for anyone to position their face directly in front of mine and raise their voice with those 
'y' words." Whitton, supra note 11, at 473. 
127. See Ryan & Cole, supra note 52, at 184-85. 
128. See COUPLAND ET AL., supra note 41, at 37; see also Felstiner & Sarat, supra note 3, at 
1449-50. 
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be familiar. As noted above,129 many elderly freely disclose their age, even 
though such disclosures at initial meetings are viewed as socially taboo 
among the non-elderly. 130 The elderly may also explicitly refer to 
themselves as "old" or "elderly," or appear to be self-obsessed. 131 While 
such "self-handicapping" strategies appear to be classic signs of feeble-
mindedness, they may be motivated by needs that are common to all ages 
and that have nothing to do with cognitive decline. These strategies might, 
for example, be designed to: 1) elicit patience or sympathy; 2) elicit 
compliments or praise by the younger speaker that the older person is, for 
example, "remarkable for her age," thereby bolstering an older person's 
self-esteem; or 3) act as "a means for gaining compliance or services. ,,132 
However, the impact on the younger interlocutor might be that the elderly 
person is seen as self-centered, selfish, or "not all there." 
2. Off-Topic Verbosity 
From the perspective of the non-elderly, it is common for the elderly to 
become obsessed with seeming trivialities. For example, researchers 
transcribed the following conversation between an eighty-five year old 
woman ("D") and a younger woman ("Je"). Although suffering no 
cognitive impairment, D was effectively homebound after an operation and 
partially blind. 133 
D: but in all ways prices are crazy(.) now(.) er for example at 
breakfast{.) I never could eat breakfast{.) a couple of biscuits are 
all I like for my breakfast 
JC: mm 
D: I like a plain biscuit I like an Osbourne biscuit{.) well, Edna 
got them for me{.) um{.) oh until about oh about two or three 
months ago(.) she said to me well she said{.) I had a real shock 
today{.) she said she had always got the biscuits at such and such a 
place but she went into another supermarket that she doesn't often 
go into{.) and the same packet of biscuits(.) Osbourne biscuits 
which she had been paying twenty-five pence for(.) in this shop 
129. See supra text accompanying notes 104-107. 
130. See COUPLAND ET AL., supra note 41, at 56. 
131. See id. at 60. 
132. [d. at 49. 
133. See id. at 39. 
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were fifteen (1.0) now(.) a packet of biscuits(.) and ten pence 
variation on them 
JC: gosh (.) that's a lot isn't it? 
0: I think there should be some price control 
JC: mm(.) mm(.) there isn't though(.) is there?134 
Interestingly, JC-a researcher in elderly discourse-found D's 
conversation to be "mundane" and "overassertive. ,,135 It might not be 
unusual for 0 to launch into another discussion of biscuits, a trend "that is 
all too easy to ascribe vaguely to cognitive decrement. ,,136 However, 
alternative explanations exist: 
It is entirely understandable that [0] should take whatever limited 
opportunities she has to be conversationally assertive and that, 
through a combination of limited topic repertoire, infrequent social 
contacts, and a largely non-changing milieu, she should misjudge 
the newsworthiness of the issue to her interlocutors. 137 
Thus, under this interpretation, ostensibly decremental behavior might 
actually be one of the few modes of assertiveness left to 0.138 JC's vague 
responses betray a sense of not knowing how to interpret all of this. 
A related strategy sometimes employed by the elderly is "time-shifting-
into the past, from focus on the present or recent past. ,,139 The past is a time 
necessarily unknown to a younger interlocutor, and, as a result, furnishes a 
means to assert control in conversation. Once again, this is hardly the stuff 
of mental impairment. 
134. Id. at 42-43. The punctuation of this passage follows the conventions of discourse 
analysis: the parentheses with a period signify a brief pause; a number in parenthesis describes the 
length of a pause in seconds; and italicized syllables were heavily stressed by the speaker. See id. at 
200. 
135. Id. at 42. 
136. /d. 
137. Id. at 43. The negotiation of conversational asseniveness or, put another way, "topic and 
tloor control," is a critical element in discourse generally and has been studied in the context of 
attorney/client interactions. See, e.g., Gellhorn et a!., supra note 117, at 283-88; Linda F. Smith, 
Interviewing Clients: A Linguistic Comparison of the "Traditional" Interview and the "Client-
Centered" Interview, 1 CUNICALL. REV. 541, 561-64 (1995). 
138. Other interpretations are equally plausible. Perhaps most obviously, D might simply have 
always been conversationally assertive-hardly an unknown trait among the non-elderly-and has 
remained so as she has grown older. 
139. See COUPLAND ET AL., supra note 41, at 63. 
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This analysis merely hints at the complexity of elderly discourse. 
Although conversational strategies employed by the elderly might well have 
nothing at all to do with the supposed decremental process of aging, they 
may resonate with this idea and thus lead to an assumption that the person 
actually suffers from cognitive decline. 
C. Warning Signs 
Given that intergroup discourse is rife with complexities and potential 
misunderstandings, an elderly client might be dissatisfied or seemingly never 
satisfied with legal representation. As a result, a client may act in ways that 
are disquieting to the attorney. The idea of decrement might once again lead 
an attorney to conclude that the client is impaired-an interpretation that 
conveniently absolves the attorney of responsibility for working to better 
meet the needs of the client. l40 
In fact, such disquieting behavior by clients should act-at least in the 
first instance-as a warning sign that the attorney needs to further explore 
what might be motivating or concerning a client. Two circumstances in 
which this frequently arises are with clients who repeatedly contact the 
attorney, and with clients who do not comply with ostensibly agreed-upon 
activities to further the goals of the representation. 
1. "Keeping Contact" 
Sometimes the failure to address underlying issues facing an elderly client 
or a concern about abandonment might lead such clients to "fear interruption 
of contact and bring up new concerns ... in order to continue as clients. ,,141 
This phenomenon has been called "keeping contact. ,,142 From the attorneys' 
perspective, these clients are nuisances. They call repeatedly, seemingly 
viewing the attorneys' time as limitless. While non-elderly clients may 
exhibit such behavior, attorneys are especially likely to view it as 
demonstrating a mental impairment when the clients are elderly. 
Attorneys may transform examples of "keeping contact" into indictments 
of the client's mental state. 143 However, such behavior should spur attorneys 
140. Racial stereotyping might also lead attorneys to characterize clients as "difficult.» See 
Jacobs, supra note 61, at 355. 
141. Haug & Dry, supra note 45, at 19. 
142. ld. 
143. This recalls the problem of "I'm not impaired, so you must be," noted at supra text 
accompanying notes 84-90. In Ihat earlier instance, a client's seemingly incomprehensible goals are 
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to revisit their working conception of their client's needs. Such an enterprise 
might generate a richer understanding of what is "really" concerning the 
client. 144 
2. Noncompliance 
Clients sometimes agree to perform certain activities designed to promote 
the clients' goals, such as conduct factual research, drop off relevant papers, 
or provide information over the telephone. Often to the attorney's surprise, 
clients fail to complete what they have agreed to do. Again, while such a 
"tactic of resistance" has been observed among clients generally,145 when the 
client is elderly, attorneys might presume mental impairment, and suspect 
that the client is somehow sabotaging the success of the representation 
because of an inability to follow directions or understand consequences. 
Instead of the convenient interpretation of mental impairment, such behavior 
might-like "keeping contact"-mean that the attorney may have seriously 
misconstrued-or at least could understand more about-issues facing the 
client. 146 
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE THEORY 
The preceding discussion has explored how a single social assumption-
the idea of decrement-influences the ways attorneys and elderly clients 
think and act. This discussion, of course, has vastly simplified the many 
circumstances that may influence such interactions. However, even this 
simplified discussion raises important questions about how best to 
conceptualize what attorneys can and should do when they represent elderly 
clients. 
This section will first consider these questions by discussing a cornerstone 
of client-centered lawyering-the process of "empathic understanding" -and 
the impact of this technique on elderly clients in light of the preceding 
dismissed as a product of mental incompetence-a far easier conclusion to reach than to consider 
alternative, "rational" explanations for the client's behavior. 
144. It is also possible that "keeping contact" is motivated by what would appear to an outsider 
to be a disproportionate anxiety about some "small" matter. Again, while this may appear to 
manifest cognitive decline, a more likely explanation is simply that isolation has diminished the 
scope of the "world" of the client, and thus what occurs within that world is especially significant to 
the client. See supra text accompanying notes 133-39. 
145. See, e.g., Felstiner & Sarat, supra note 3, at 1467-70; White, supra note 61, at 44-52. 
146. See Haug & Ory, supra note 45, at 27-28 (noting that failure to take medication among 
the elderly might be an assertion of independence). 
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discussion. Next, this section will draw upon this analysis in order to 
explore more generally assumptions underlying client-centered lawyering. 
A. The Virtues and Pitfalls of Empathic Understanding 
"Empathic understanding" is fundamental to client-centered lawyering.147 
Binder, Bergman and Price firmly believe in the power of this technique; 
they quote Carl Rogers who wrote that empathic understanding is a means to 
"enterD into the experience of clients in order to develop a feeling for their 
inner world and how they view both this inner world and the world of people 
and [events] around them. ,,148 In the context of representing elderly 
clients,149 empathic understanding may be especially useful. Given social 
isolation and devaluation, some elderly clients exhibit presumed mental 
impairments because of a fear of loneliness. Indeed, such clients may crave 
"empathic understanding" to such an extent that the technique may reveal 
complexities and ambivalences in a client's perspective that would otherwise 
remain concealed. ISO 
147. BINDER ET AL., supra note I, at 40-42. Binder, Bergman and Price suggest the technique 
of "active Iistening"-a "process of picking up a client's message and sending it back in a reflective 
statement which mirrors what you have heard" -as the best way to promote empathic 
understanding. [d. at 41, 52. The centrality that Binder, Bergman and Price ascribe to this 
technique has not been without its critics. See, e.g., Stephen Ellmann, Empathy and Approval, 43 
HASTINGS LJ. 991, 1005-1010 (1992). In a related vein, some commentators have argued that 
client-centered lawyering is not the apolitical set of neutral techniques that it purports to be. See, 
e.g., William H. Simon, Homo Psycho/ogicus: Notes on a New Legal Formalism, 32 STAN. L. 
REV. 487, 548-50 (1980). See generally Jacobs, supra note 61 (arguing that client-centered 
lawyering may reproduce racial prejudice). 
148. BINDER ET AL., supra note I, at 40. 
149. Binder, Bergman and Price suggest that the client-centered approach cannot be used "in 
instances where a client ... suffers from mental incapacity." [d. at 20 n.17, 285 n.63. This is, of 
course, true in instances of patently severe mental impairment (although, as noted supra, text 
accompanying notes 73-77, even such "severe" cases may result from reversible causes). However, 
jettisoning the whole approach when clients are questionably incompetent necessarily begs the 
question of how best to explore issues of competency within a client-centered framework. 
150. This idea received particular attention in the literature addressing doctor/elderly patient 
interactions. See Waitzkin et aI., supra note 77, at 342 (in a medical context, arguing for 
"supportive listening" during which "doctors should let patients tell their stories ... in an open-
ended way"); Haug & Ory, supra note 45, at 29 ("an empathetic manner signals respect for the 
concerns of the patient" and is "an essential element in satisfactory doctor-elderly patient 
relationships. "). Empathic understanding can sometimes yield important insights. For example, the 
psychiatric literature describes one elderly patient who claimed that she had received a call from her 
doctor claiming that she did not need surgery-a call which, in fact, had never taken place. See 
Appelbaum & Roth, supra note 15, at 1463-64. However, during a second interview, while 
maintaining that the telephone call took place, the patient also described a profound fear of 
abandonment as a result of the surgery. This led her consulting psychiatrist to conclude that the 
patient's "psychotic response to the recommendation for surgery was an attempt to draw those 
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However, "empathic understanding" also entails significant risks. This 
sort of response-an "accommodating" or "high attuning" behavior-may 
reinforce social norms about aging lSI and may promote dependency.ls2 As 
three leading researchers on the discourse of the elderly have put it: 
[T]hose elderly who see themselves as 'old and of declining 
health'-and from our own data this is not at all uncommon-may 
seek out and cue sympathetic and attuned responses from their 
interactants. This can be non-supportive in the longer term to the 
extent that they may reinforce ill and aging identities .... IS3 
The consequences of such a scenario for attorney/client relationships are 
troubling. Some elderly clients may attribute difficulties-a negligent 
landlord, an abusive relative-to their advanced age, not to the actions of 
individuals who can legally be forced to modify their behavior. ls4 Under this 
circumstance, "empathic understanding" might reinforce damaging 
stereotypes about aging on the part of both the attorney and client. 
Alternatives to "empathic understanding" carry their own advantages and 
disadvantages. 155 For example, a more active, "critical lawyering" approach 
might challenge client assumptions and affirmatively convince the client that 
situational factors-not the progressive decline of old age-lie at the root of a 
problem. Such a strategy might combat dependency and foster 
independence. Indeed, one study has shown that such a strategy tends to 
motivate formerly disengaged individuals to be more active and social at 
least in a non-legal context. 156 These effects obviously could be significant 
when negotiating an attorney/client relationship and promote a more active 
stance on the part of the client. 157 
around her into deeper involvement." Id. In the end, "{w]hen these concerns were pointed out to 
her and empathized with, she indicated that although she still feared the surgery, she would accept 
it." Id .. 
151. See Giles et ai., supra note 88, at 13-17. 
152. See id. at 13-14. 
153. [d. at 17 (citation omitted). 
154. See Rodin & Langer, supra note 46, at 23; see also Banziger & Drevenstedt, supra note 
45, at 472. 
155. These questions are also analyzed in psychological literature more generally. Much of the 
client-centered lawyering literature draws upon the work of Carl Rogers, who emphasized empathy 
and "unconditional positive regard" in psychotherapy. See Simon, supra note 147, at 511-16. 
However, other approaches to psychotherapy adopt a far more active-even challenging-role for 
the therapist. See Ellmann, supra note 147, at 1011. 
156. See Rodin & Langer, supra note 46, at 24. 
157. See id. at 25 ("restructuring the environment to make it more demanding, and then 
motivating elderly people to increase their cognitive ability, leads to improvements in memory that 
are generalizable"). 
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Of course, such a stance potentially creates problems. If, as noted above, 
some conversational strategies by the elderly are designed to elicit 
sympathy,IS8 clients might grow to dislike such a "low-attuning" stance and 
the attorney who employs it. Given the internalization of the idea of 
decrement, the elderly client might be offended by the attorney's socially 
inappropriate lack of sympathy for the conventional effects of aging. 
Moreover, the great risks of the "traditional" non-client-centered approaches 
to lawyering might emerge: the imposition of an attorney's value system, 
further disempowering already disempowered groups, and shutting down 
dialogue. 159 
B. Consequences for Theory 
The two-edged nature of empathic understanding when representing 
elderly clients furnishes a point of entry for considering some of the 
premises underlying client-centered lawyering. This exploration must be 
undertaken with care; an important qualification in the literature on client-
centered lawyering is that its principles might require modification or might 
not apply with respect to certain clients or certain cases. l60 That said, 
however, the influence of the idea of decrement raises questions about some 
settled ways of talking about client-centered lawyering. 
Client-centered lawyering holds that the client's perspective is the 
touchstone of enlightened advocacy. 161 This approach embodies a set of 
158. See supra text accompanying notes 129-32. 
159. See Dinerstein, supra note 2, at 720; BINDER ET AL., supra note I, at 16-24. 
160. For example, a commonly accepted observation is that unlike poor or "outsider" clients, 
corporate or wealthy clients are not likely to be subject to attorney domination. See, e.g., 
Dinerstein, supra note 2, at 720. Binder, Bergman and Price also recognize that a client-centered 
lawyer need not be a "blind instrumentalist" when "a client's values conflict with fundamental 
moral precepts or positive legal rules." BINDER ET AL., supra note I, at 18-19. 
161. See BINDER ET AL., supra note I, at 17; Smith, supra note 137, at 543. This approach 
has amacted criticism. Some critiques hold that the standard version of client-centered lawyering 
does not go far enough in promoting the autonomy of the client. See, e.g., Alex 1. Hurder, 
Negotiating the Lawyer-Client Relationship: A Search for Equality and Collaboration, 44 BUFF. L. 
REV. 71 (1996) (advocating that allorney and client explicitly "negotiate" the terms of the 
allorney/client relationship). Conversely, some of the criticism is directed at how theories of c1ient-
centered lawyering go 100 far in valorizing the client's goals to the exclusion of broader social and 
moral principles that might be at stake in the representation. See, e.g., Robert M. Bastress, Client 
Centered Counseling and Moral Accountability for Lawyers, 10 J. LEGAL PROF. 97 (1985); Stephen 
Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 717, 748-49 (1987). There also have been recent 
stirrings that client-centered lawyering and the standard critiques of it do not capture the 
complexities of how the mind works as explored by cognitive science. See Gary L. Blasi, What 
Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the Functions of Theory, 45 1. LEGAL 
EDUC. 313, 317 (1995); Steven L. Winter, Cursing the Darkness, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1115, 
i _ 
152 ARIZONA STATE LA W JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J! 
strategies that rests upon certain assumptions. "A client-centered conception 
assumes that most clients are capable of thinking through the complexities of 
their problems. In particular, it posits that clients are usually more expert 
than lawyers when it comes to the economic, social and psychological 
dimensions of problems. ,,162 Client-centered lawyering thus recognizes "the 
importance of clients' expertise, thoughts and feelings in resolving 
problems. ,,163 In elaborating this notion, some commentators have adopted 
the metaphor of "lawyer as translator" through which attorneys should seek 
to translate client stories in order to educate and persuade legal decision"; 
makers. 1M 
The client-centered lawyering model and its elaborations have been and 
continue to be critical in seeking to supplant the hidden (or sometimes not so 
hidden) premise that _ lawyers know what is best for clients. 165 This 
perspective also has produced fascinating scholarly narratives about lawyers 
directing a course of litigation in accordance with conventional legal 
categories-and doing a good job of it under those terms-yet fundamentally 
misapprehending what clientS want and how clients want to get what they 
want. 166 
The insidious influence of the idea of decrement demonstrates how useful 
a client-centered lawyering model can be. Operating under the sway of the 
idea of decrement, attorneys may systematically misapprehend the needs of 
elderly clients. Such situations are classic examples of lawyers unthinkingly 
applying their own norms while another set of equally valid norms-the 
client's-are silenced. This highlights the difference and "otherness" 
between attorney and client, and how attorneys need to guard against what 
seems to be "natural" and "obvious" when defining the means and ends of 
representation. 167 
However, the influence of the idea of decrement also points to how 
prevailing conceptions of attorney/client interactions simplify aspects of 
interviewing and counseling, thus impoverishing a lawyer's sense of 
complexity and possibility when representing clients. These simplifications 
include the notion that there is a single client "story" or "voice," that there 
1129-32 (1994). For an overview of some of these critiques and others, see generally Robert D. 
Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 501 
(1990). 
162. BINDER ET AL., supra note I, at 17. 
163. [d. at 18. 
164. See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 2, at 1331-39; Gilkerson, supra note 2, at 914-18. 
165. See Dinerstein, supra note 2, at 700; Smith, supra note 137, at 542-43. 
166. See, e.g., GERALD P. LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF 
PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992); Cunningham, supra note 2; White, supra note 61. 
167. See Davis, supra note 59, at 1643. 
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is such a thing as an "autonomous" client, and that there is such a thing as a 
~'neutral" attorney. I will address each of these simplifications in turn. 
l. The Unitary Client "Story" or "Voice" 
Given that client-centered lawyering hopes to control attorneys' 
inclinations to dominate discourse and misapprehend or ignore client 
perspectives, discussions of client-centered lawyering sometimes presuppose 
a single and authentic "story" or "voice. "168 However, as every practitioner 
knows, problems faced by clients rarely come in neat packages; at any point 
in time, client perspectives-like the perspectives of everyone else-are rife 
with competing concerns, ambiguities, and ambivalences, and thus are not 
unitary. 169 These dissonances and instabilities are not merely risks of 
interviewing and counseling, but in many ways define these very 
processes. 170 
In addition, perspectives of both lawyers and clients are shot through with 
assumptions like the idea of decrement. These assumptions play out in a 
multitude of ways. Sometimes meanings cohere, sometimes not, but any 
client "story" is inevitably the product of a complex set of shifting meanings 
negotiated through dialogue. 171 
2. The Autonomous Client 
Client-centered lawyering values client "autonomy" in order to preserve 
the integrity of client perspectives.172 By reaching out to clients through 
168. See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 2, at 1335-38; Gilkerson, supra note 2, at 897; 
Margulies, supra note 18, at 1079-80. 
169. See Altieri, supra note 86, at 2119; Naomi Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, 81 GEO. L.J. 
2475, 2485-93 (1993); Dinerstein, supra note 2, at 715-16; Theory and Experience, supra note 31, 
at 1032-33. 
170. See Dinerstein, supra note 2, at 716 (criticizing "the unfortunate message that the 
counselor's role is the technical one of laying out options and alternatives rather than participating 
fully in the often messy process of making real world decisions"); Gellhom et aI., supra note 117, 
at 248 (criticizing the conception of client interviews as "dominated by administrative tasks, and by 
fact gathering"). For an insightful treatment of the complexities of attorney/client interactions in 
the context of divorce cases, see generally Felstiner & Sarat, supra note 3. 
171. See supra text accompanying notes 117-46. 
172. See BINDER ET AL., supra note I, at 261; Beverly Balos, The Bounds of Professionalism: 
Challenging Our Students, Challenging Ourselves, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 129, 131 (1997). 
"Autonomy derives from the Greek roots 'auto' for self and 'nomos' for law, literally self-ruling." 
Susan G. Kupfer, Authentic Legal Practices, 10 GEO. 1. LEGAL ETHICS 33, 73 n.128 (1996) (citing 
Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, in THE INNER CITADEL: ESSAYS ON INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY 27, 32 
(John Christman ed., 1989». 
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techniques such as empathic understanding, the idea of client autonomy 
minimizes attorneys' tendencies to overwhelm clients' values and 
perspectives. This, in turn, frees clients to explore their own values and 
circumstances. 
Autonomy, however, also entails troubling simplifications and 
inconsistencies that render its descriptions of attorney/client interactions 
problematic. In the context of practice theory, the idea of autonomy 
presupposes that clients have some authentic core that is distinct from 
external influences. 173 This in turn, presupposes first, that this core can and 
should remain stable as clients talk to attorneys, and second, that such a core 
is independent of the social world inhabited by attorneys and clients. Such a 
view fails to take into account that both attorneys and clients are constrained 
and influenced by assumptions about each other, and that these assumptions 
play out as attorneys and clients interact. It is uncertain what constitutes a 
client's authentic core, given that the core itself is made up of social 
assumptions and interactions, including interactions with attorneys. 174 
Even setting aside this conceptual difficulty, a narrow focus on 
"autonomy" raises troubling questions. If an attorney's role is to preserve 
client autonomy by elaborating and translating the client's perspective 
without changing it,175 an attorney may choose to empathize with and thereby 
affirm, for example, an elderly client's feeling of helplessness in the face of 
feared cognitive decline. 176 While fearing to taint the client's perspective, 
this attorney risks reaffirming the disempowering force of stereotypes 
applied to the elderly and others-a result that is not only disturbing, but that 
turns the values of empathic understanding and client-centered lawyering on 
their heads. 177 
173. See, e.g., Gilkerson, supra note 2, at 918 (stressing the importance of "[p]reserving and 
advancing the integrity of the client's story"); Alfieri, supra note 86, at 2146 (the primary task of 
poverty lawyers "is to restore integrity to the voices and stories" of clients); Marcy Strauss, Toward 
a Revised Model of Attorney-Client Relationship: The Argument for Autonomy, 65 N.C. L. REV. 
315, 336-345 (1987). The notion of autonomy and authenticity appears in other contexts as well. 
See, e.g., Kupfer, supra note 172, at 71 (applying notion "of a true identity, of an inner voice" to 
ethical decision-making). 
174. See Winter, supra note 161, at 1129. 
175. Clark Cunningham captures this idea of autonomy when he notes that "[t]he good 
translator does not alter the speaker's meaning without the speaker's consent." Cunningham. supra 
note 2, at 1300. 
176. See supra text accompanying notes 147-59. 
177. In a related vein, some commentators have argued that client-centered lawyering is not as 
neutral as it purports to be. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 147, at 548-50; see generally Jacobs, 
supra note 61, at 345 (arguing that client-centered lawyering may reproduce racial prejudice). Ann 
Shalleck recently advocated an active role for attorneys in counteracting pervasive stereotyping-
albeit well-meant stereotyping-of battered women. See Theory and Experience, supra note 31, at 
1033-36. 
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3. The Neutral Attorney 
The same virtues and shortcomings of the idea of autonomy apply to the 
idea that attorneys should remain "neutral" when interacting with clients. 178 
Binder, Bergman and Price cite "the importance of neutrality" by again 
quoting Carl Rogers: "[lawyers] must, to the best of their abilities, put aside 
their own biases, prejudices, and points of view in order to understand as 
clearly as possible the points of view of their clients." 179 The term 
"neutrality" captures how critical it is for lawyers to recognize the power of 
their influence, and to counteract this influence by empathizing with clients. 
"Neutrality, " however, simplifies the meaning-making process of 
attorneys just like "autonomy" simplifies the meaning-making process of 
clients. The purportedly "neutral" attorney makes sense of the world 
through cultural assumptions and hidden premises like the idea of decrement. 
After all, attorneys who hear clients' stories-just like clients who hear 
attorneys' stories-cannot help but situate stories within the attorney's own 
experience. 180 It is thus uncertain what, if anything, would be left of 
meaning, even assuming attorneys could "put aside their own ... points of 
Ironically, the choice of whether or not to challenge stereotypes might be illusory given that the 
most rigid client-centered lawyer who understands the internalization of oppressive social 
stereotypes like the idea of decrement would almost certainly seek to disabuse clients of the 
destructive force of such stereotypes, even if only through subtle cues in conversation. William 
Simon has written extensively about how attorney perspectives on what is "right" for the client 
inevitably, if subtly, color how attorneys counsel clients. See Simon, supra note 3, at 1102-04; 
Simon, supra note 27, at 213; see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Doing the Right Thing, 70 WASH. 
u. L.Q. 691, 700 (1992) ("the notion that advice can be given unshaped by the adviser's own 
ethical values is absurd in fact"); Theory and Experience, supra note 31, at 1056 (describing how 
"words, actions and a!!itudes [of a!!orneysj affect the client's understanding of herself, her ability to 
take action, and her choice of what to do and how to present herself in the world"). A related and 
burgeoning area of inquiry addresses "therapeutic jurisprudence," which, among other things, 
examines how legal practices inevitably promote or inhibit the psychological well-being of actors in 
the legal process. See, e.g., Barbara A. Babb, An Interdisciplinary Approach to Family Law 
Jurisprudence: Application of an Ecological and Therapeutic Perspective, 72 IND. L.J. 775, 798-99 
(1997). 
178. See BINDER ET AL., supra note I, at 288. 
179. Id. at 40; see also Dinerstein, supra note 161, at 580-81 (recognizing that "such neutrality 
is inevitably false," but noting that the idea of "neutrality" still has value as long as attorneys 
recognize that it "is a goal they will never quite achieve"). 
180. For commentators who have noted how attorneys' expectations influence the 
interpretation of a client's situation, see BAKHTIN, supra note 39, at 291; Cahn, supra note 169, at 
2490 (describing how the author's "story of what happened to my client is informed by my own 
expectations"); Cunningham, supra note 2, at 1336-38; Lopez, supra note 3, at 1613-14; Margulies, 
supra note 68, at 709-11 (discussing the operation of stock stories and stereotypes in assessing 
clients in a law school clinic); White, supra note 61, at 45-48. 
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view," given that all meaning has a "point of view. "lSI This is true :even 
with the usual caveat that attorneys should be neutral "to the best of their 
abilities" or "as much as possible" because even these qualifiers assert that 
there is a way to approach meaning apart from our own assumptions and 
"points of view." IS2 In this frame, attorney "neutrality" -conceptualized as 
a goal that can be approached but never attained-may cause more harm than 
good by setting forth a goal that has no meaningful content. 183 
4. Complexities 
The influence of the idea of decrement demonstrates the importance of 
learning how stereotypes influence how attorneys think about clients. By 
understanding the operation of such assumptions, attorneys might take a 
more nuanced, complex view of clients and their situations. 
However, this seemingly incontrovertible point carries the risk that now 
that the scales have fallen from our eyes about the idea of decrement, we are 
finally in a position to truly understand elderly clients. This type of trap 
assumes, first, that the stereotype operates equally among all members of the 
group, and, second, that the identification of one stereotype unmasks the 
"real" client. 
In fact, not all elderly people internalize the idea of decrement, and not 
all do so in the same way. 184 The idea of decrement is merely one idea 
among the multitudes that define how we think about and act in the world. 
Consider what this article has not addressed. It has not addressed the impact 
of genderlS5 or race,186 the impact that divergent or similar personalities 
181. Alfieri, supra note 86, at 2121 (criticizing a "perspectiveless" theory of practice); see 
also supra text accompanying notes 36-40. Analogous conceptions of "neutrality" in the realm of 
judicial decision-making have long been under attack. See Rubinson, supra note 39, at 14. 
182. Stanley Fish placed the issue of "neutrality" into a larger frame. Fish argued against 
what he calls the possibility of "critical self-consciousness." FISH, supra note 37, at 436-67. 
"Critical self-consciousness" holds that we can rise above "interests, preferences and biases" and 
avoid "prejudgments" through some combination of self-awareness and tentativeness about our own 
beliefs. According to Fish, this process "is itself an 'interested' act, that is, an act performed within 
a set of assumptions-concerning what is and is not evidence and what are and are not criteria for 
judgment-that is, constitutive of and inseparable from some partial view of the world." Jd. at 439. 
Skepticism is not the answer because skepticism itself operates "within-and not outside of-the 
already structured field that is consciousness." Jd. at 440. 
183. It is worth noting as well that social scientists have found that exhortations to be 
"unbiased" and "impartial" have no impact on the human tendency to view facts as confirming what 
is already believed. See, e.g., Lord et aI., supra note 39, at 1239. 
184. See supra text accompanying notes 91-97. 
185. It has been noted how social attitudes toward elderly women differ from social attitudes 
toward elderly men, and that elderly men might negotiate the process of aging differently than 
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might have on attorney/client discourse,l87 the significance of the socio-
economic status of the client or of the attorney, 188 the impact of an elderly 
client's surroundings (such as a nursing home),189 the impact of an attorney's 
or client's appearance,l90 the implications of how attorneys might assume that 
their individual experiences with the elderly are generalizable to the elderly 
population at large,191 and how other assumptions might be related to the idea 
of decrement, such as the idea that the elderly are less deserving of attention 
because they have already lived the bulk of their lives or because they 
receive a disproportionate share of societal resources. l92 
Of course, this list could continue indefinitely. As the philosopher Daniel 
Dennett has noted, "[i]ndividual styles are truly unique, the product. of 
untold billions of serendipitous encounters over the ages, encounters that 
produced first a unique genome, and then a unique upbringing, and finally a 
unique set of life experiences." 193 This bewildering complexity insures that 
there is never a point in time when two socially situated actors-each with 
unique "individual styles" described by Dennett-truly "understand" each 
other, especially in a task as involved and ill-defined as legal 
elderly women. For a sampling of some lines of inquiry on this important distinction, see GIBSON, 
supra note 45, at 75-77; PRAlT & NORRIS, supra note 42, at 88-89; Marilyn Helterline & Marilyn 
Nouri, Aging and Gender: Values and Continuity, 6 J. WOMEN & AGING 19, 19-23 (1994). 
186. See Appelbaum & Roth, supra note 15, at 1466; Giles et aI., supra note 88, at 15-17; see 
also Jacobs, supra note 61 (addressing the impact of race in counseling). 
187. See Appelbaum & Roth, supra note 15, at 1466. 
188. See White, supra note 61, at 45-48. 
189. See John F. Nussbaum, Communication and the Nursing Home Environment: 
Survivability as a Function of Resident-Nursing Staff Affinity, in COMMUNICATION, HEALTH AND 
THE ELDERLY 155 (Howard Giles et al. eds., 1990). For example, ugiven the fact that many 
nursing home residents are impaired in cognitive function, all residents are thus assumed to be 
similarly impaired." Wetle, supra note 16, at 264. 
190. See Charles Stangor & James E. Lange, Mental Representations of Social Groups: 
Advances in Understanding Stereotypes and Stereotyping, in 26 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 357 (Mark P. Zann ed., 1994). 
191. Social psychologists have explored the human tendency to overestimate the "normativity" 
of individual experience. See, e.g., Dale W. Grimn & Lee Ross, Subjective Construal, Social 
Inference, and Human Misunderstanding, in 24 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 319,337-38 (Mark P. Zann ed., 1991). 
192. See Wetle, supra note 16, at 260-63; Whitton, supra note 11, at 469-74. 
193. DENNElT, supra note 17, at 450. This basic idea has been expressed in many ways in 
many different disciplines. See, e.g., BAKHTlN, supra note 39, at 290 ("In any given historical 
moment of verbal-ideological life, each generation at each social level has its own language; 
moreover, every age group has as a matter of fact its own language, its own vocabulary, its own 
particular accentual system that, in their turn, vary depending on social level, academic institution . 
. . and other stratifying factors. H); FISH, supra note 37, at 30 (Ueach of us is a member of not one 
but innumerable interpretive communities in relation to which different kinds of belief are operating 
with different weight and force");. 
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representation. 194 While this view raises questions about ideas· like 
"neutrality" and "autonomy," it also highlights the importance of greater 
understanding and recognition of the complexity of attorney/client 
interactions. 
C. Consequences for Practitioners and Teachers of Practice 
Client-centered lawyering remains a vital way of conceptualizing 
attorney/client interactions, but one that simplifies important dimensions of 
the lawyering .enterprise. A greater recognition of these complexities, 
however, does not mean that practitioners can or should spend endless hours 
"exploring meaning" with their clients. The pressures of practice render this 
goal impractical. 
Nevertheless, a greater emphasis on these additional dimensions of 
experience will have several benefits. First, client-centered lawyering, by 
invoking the power of certain techniques and the goal of "attorney 
neutrality, " tends to send the message that an attorney can reach a 
reasonably full understanding of client perspectives. This fosters the illusion 
that there comes a point in time when an attorney has "got it," thus 
deadening an attorney's ability to be alive to possibilities of meaning at all 
points during the representation. Ironically, by recognizing that such a point 
of understanding is never possible or even conceivable, attorneys might gain 
a greater, more nuanced understanding of client perspectives, the central 
goal of client-centered lawyering. 
Second, while attorney/client interactions are sometimes viewed either as 
a minefield of potential threats to attorney neutrality and client autonomy or 
as a dry and technical process of data collection, their complexity insures 
that they are neither. Attorney/client interactions are, in fact, far more 
exciting and fascinating-messy dialogues between two human beings whose 
senses of each other and the world are fluid and dynamic. Coming to temis 
with this aspect of lawyering may not only promote more effective 
representation, but may also foster greater engagement in a profession that 
sorely needs to counteract pervasive alienation and dissatisfaction. 
Third, at least in certain contexts, an understanding that stereotypes are 
internalized by lawyers and clients opens up the possibility for progressive 
194. See Blasi, supra note 161, at 317 ("At bottom, lawyering entails solving (or making 
worse) problems of clients and others, under conditions of extraordinary complexity and 
uncertainty, in a virtually infinite range of settings. "). 
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social change through individual representation. 195 If attorneys come to view 
the social webs and cognitive processes that define and structure meaning as 
integral to practice and worthy of study, attorneys would be in a better 
position to learn through clients and to help clients learn through them. This 
approach offers the possibility of enriching our conception of legal 
representation by emphasizing "mutual education, "196_a process of 
transformation to be experienced by both attorneys and clients. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The idea of decrement constituteS an invisible premise in how both 
attorneys and elderly clients view "competence." This assumption, in turn, 
defines how attorneys and elderly clients view the world and each other. 
This raises questions about the content of ideas like client voice and 
autonomy, and attorney neutrality-foundational concepts in discourse about 
attorney/client interactions. Moreover, given that the idea of decrement is 
one assumption among the multitude that define how we interpret the world, 
this analysis highlights the extraordinary complexity of any undertaking 
through which attorneys hope to "understand" the perspective of others and, 
through that understanding, to act on their behalf. 
This analysis in no way delegitimizes client-centered lawyering or proves 
it "wrong." To the contrary, the tendency of so many practitioners and law 
students to believe that they really know what is best for the client 
demonstrates the utility of a strong-albeit simplified-theory that 
emphasizes the values of client perspectives. Similarly, issues of attorney 
power-whether defined in terms of cultural and class distinctions especially 
important in poverty law practice, or defined in terms of the power of 
possessing an arcane body of knowledge not available to a layperson-argues 
in favor of constant vigilance against overwhelming clients' perspectives. At 
the same time, a greater recognition of the extraordinary complexity of the 
lawyering enterprise holds the promise of promoting a more nuanced 
conception of client perspectives while, at the same time, rendering the 
process of lawyering more engaging and more transforming. 
195. This perspective resonates with recent scholarship on how "power" is constituted through 
individual interactions, and thus how progressive social change can (or, as some would say, must) 
be sought on these individual levels. See, e.g., Steven Winter, The Power Thing, 82 VA. L. REV. 
721 (1996). 
196. White, supra note 99, at 743. 
